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How To Make A Decision: The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Thomas L. Saaty+ 
Policy makers at all levels of decision making in organizations use 
multiple criteria to analyze their complex problems. Multicriteria thinking 
is used formally to facilitate their decision making. Through trade-offs 
it clarifies the advantages and disadvantages of policy options under 
circumstances of risk and uncertainty. It is also a tool vital to forming 
corporate strategies needed for effective competition. 
Nearly all of us, in one way or another, have been brought up to 
believe that clearheaded logical thinking is our only sure way to face and 
solve problems. We also believe that our feelings and our judgments 
must be subjected to the acid test of deductive thinking. But experience 
suggests that deductive thinking is not natural. Indeed, we have to 
practice, and for a long time, before we can do it well. Since complex 
problems usually have many related factors, traditional logical thinking 
leads to sequences of ideas that are so tangled that their interconnections 
are not readily discerned. 
The lack of a coherent procedure to make decisions is especially 
troublesome when our intuition alone cannot help us to determine 
which of several options is the most desirable, or the least objectionable, 
and neither logic nor intuition are of help. Therefore, we need a way to 
determine which objective outweighs another, both in the near and long 
terms. Since we are concerned with real-life problems we must recognize 
the necessity for trade-offs to best serve the common interest. Therefore, 
this process should also allow for consensus building and compromise. 
Individual knowledge and experience are inadequate in making 
decisions concerning the welfare and quality of life for a group. 
Participation and debate are needed both among individuals and 
between the groups affected. Here two aspects of group decision 
making have to be considered. The first is a rather minor complication, 
namely, the discussion and exchange within the group to reach some 
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kind of consensus on the given problem. The second is of much greater 
difficulty. The holistic nature of the given problem necessitates that it be 
divided into smaller subject-matter areas within which different groups 
of experts determine how each area affects the total problem. A large 
and complex problem can rarely be decomposed simply into a number 
of smaller problems whose solutions can be combined into an overall 
answer. If this process is successful, one can then reconstruct the initial 
question and review the proposed solutions. A last and often crucial 
disadvantage of many traditional decision-making methods is that they 
require specialized expertise to design the appropriate structure and 
then to embed the decision-making process in it. 
A decision-making approach should have the following 
characteristics: 
be simple in construct, 
be adaptable to both groups and individuals, 
be natural to our intuition and general thinking, 
encourage compromise and consensus building, and 
not require inordinate specialization to master and communicate. 
In addition, the details of the processes leading up to the decision- 
making process should be easy to review. 
At the core of the problems that our method addresses is the need 
to assess the benefits, the costs, and the risks of the proposed solutions. 
We must answer such questions as the following: Which consequences 
weigh more heavily than others? Which aims are more important than 
others? What is likely to take place? What should we plan for and how 
do we bring it about? These and other questions demand a multicriteria 
logic. It has been demonstrated over and over by practitioners who use 
the theory discussed in this paper, that multicriteria logic gives different 
and often better answers to these questions than ordinary logic and does 
it efficiently. 
To make a decision one needs various kinds of knowledge, 
information, and technical data. These concern 
details about the problem for which a decision is needed, 
the people or actors involved, 
their objectives and policies, 
the influences affecting the outcomes, and 
the time horizons, scenarios, and constraints. 
The set of potential outcomes or alternatives from which to choose 
are the essence of decision making. In laying out the framework for 
, 
making a decision, one needs to sort the elements into groupings or 
clusters that have similar influences or effects. One must also arrange 
them in some rational order to trace the outcome of these influences. 
Briefly, we see decision making as a process that involves the following 
steps: 
(i) Structure a problem with a model that shows the problem’s key 
(2) Elicit judgments that reflect knowledge, feelings, or emotions. 
(3) Represent those judgments with meaningful numbers. 
(4) Use these numbers to calculate the priorities of the elements of the 
( 5 )  Synthesize these results to determine an overall outcome. 
(6) Analyze sensitivity to changes in judgment. 
elements and their relationships. 
hierarchy. 
The decision-making process described in this paper meets 
these criteria. I call it the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The AHP 
is about breaking a problem down and then aggregating the solutions 
of all the subproblems into a conclusion. It facilitates decision making 
by organizing perceptions, feelings, judgments, and memories into a 
framework that exhibits the forces that influence a decision. In the 
simple and most common case, the forces are arranged from the more 
general and less controllable to the more specific and controllable. 
The AHP is based on the innate human ability to make sound 
judgments about small problems. It has been applied in a variety of 
decisions and planning projects in nearly 20 countries. 
Here v n t i o d i t y  is 
Focusing on the goal of solving the problem; 
Knowing enough about aproblem to develop a complete structure 
of relations and influences; 
Having enough knowledge and experience and access to the 
knowledge and experience of others to assess the priority of influence 
and dominance (importance, preference, or likelihood to the goal as 
appropriate) among the relations in the structure; 
Allowing for differences in opinion with an ability to develop a 
best compromise. 
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How to Structure a Hierarchy 
Perhaps the most creative part of decision making that has a 
significant effect on the outcome is modeling the problem. In the AHP, 
a problem is structured as a hierarchy. This is then followed by a 
process of prioritization, which we describe in detail later. Prioritization 
involves eliciting judgments in response to questions about the 
dominance of one element over another when compared with respect 
to a property. The basic principle to follow in creating this structure is 
always to see if one can answer the following question: Can I compare 
the elements on a lower level using some or all of the elements on the 
next higher level as criteria or attributes of the lower level elements? 
A useful way to proceed in structuring a decision is to come 
down from the goal as far as one can by decomposing it into the most 
general and most easily controlled factors. One can then go up from 
the alternatives beginning with the simplest subcriteria that they 
must satisfy and aggregating the subcriteria into generic higher level 
criteria until the levels of the two processes are linked in such a way 
as to make comparison possible. 
Here are some suggestions for an elaborate design of a 
hierarchy: (i) Identify the overall goal. What are you trying to 
accomplish? What is the main question? (2) Identify the subgoals of 
the overall goal. If relevant, identify time horizons that affect the 
decision. (3) Identify criteria that must be satisfied to fulfill the 
subgoals of the overall goal. (4) Identify subcriteria under each 
criterion. Note that criteria or subcriteria may be specified in terms 
of ranges of values of parameters or in terms of verbal intensities 
such as high, medium, low. ( 5 )  Identify the actors involved. (6) 
Identify the actors’ goals. (7) Identify the actors’ policies. (8) 
Identify options or outcomes. (9) For yes-no decisions, take the 
most preferred outcome and compare the benefits and costs of 
making the decision with those of not making it. (10) Do a benefit/ 
cost analysis using marginal values. Because we are dealing with 
dominance hierarchies, ask which alternative yields the greatest 
benefit; for costs, which alternative costs the most, and for risks, 
which alternative is more risky. 
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The Hospice Problem 
I . . .  
Westmoreland County Hospital in Western Pennsylvania, like 
hospitals in many other counties around the nation, has been concerned 
with the costs of the facilities and manpower involved in taking care of 
terminally ill patients. Normally these patients do not need as much 
medical attention as do other patients. Those who best utilize the limited 
resources in a hospital are patients who require the medical attention of 
its specialists and advanced technology equipment-whose utilization 
depends on the demand of patients admitted into the hospital. The 
terminally ill need medical attention only episodically. Most of the time 
such patients need psychological support. Such support is best given by 
the patient's family, whose members are able to supply the love and care 
the patients most need. 
Choosing B s t  Hospice 
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For the mental health of the patient home therapy is a benefit. From 
the medical standpoint, especially during a crisis, the hospital provides 
a greater benefit. Most patients need the help of medical professionals 
only during a crisis. Some will also need equipment and surgery. The 
planning association of the hospital wanted to develop alternatives and 
to choose the best one considering various criteria from the standpoint 
of the patient, the hospital, the community, and society at large. In this 
problem, we need to consider the costs and benefits of the decision. Cost 
includes economic costs and all sorts of intangibles, such as inconvenience 
and pain. Such disbenefits are not directly related to benefits as their 
mathematical inverses, because patients infinitely prefer the benefits of 
good health to these intangible disbenefits. To study the problem, one 
needs to deal with benefits and with costs separately. 
Approaching the Problem 
I met with representatives of the planning association for several 
hours to decide on the best alternative. To make a decision by considering 
benefits and costs, one must first answer the question: In this problem, 
do the benefits justify the costs? If they do, then either the benefits are so 
much more important than the costs that the decision is based simply on 
benefits, or the two are so close in value that both the benefits and the 
costs should be considered. Then we use two hierarchies for the purpose 
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and make the choice by forming ratios of the priorities of the alternatives 
(benefits b,/costs c,) from them. One asks which is most beneficial in the 
benefits hierarchy (Figure 1) and which is most costly in the costs 
hierarchy (Figure 2). If the benefits do not justify the costs, the costs alone 
determine the best alternative that which is the least costly. In this 
example, we decided that both benefits and costs had to be considered 
in separate hierarchies. In a risk problem, a third hierarchy is used to 
determine the most desired alternative with respect to all three: benefits, 
costs, and risks. In this problem, we assumed risk to be the same for all 
contingencies. Whereas for most decisions one uses only a single 
hierarchy, we constructed two hierarchies for the hospice problem, one 
for benefits or gains (which model of hospice care yields the greater 
benefit) and one for costs or pains (which model costs more). 
The planning association thought the concepts of benefits and costs 
were too general to enable it to make a decision. Thus, the planners and 
I further subdivided each (benefits and costs) into detailed subcriteria to 
enable the group to develop alternatives and to evaluate the finer 
distinctions the members perceived between the three alternatives. The 
alternatives were to care for terminally ill patients at the hospital, at 
home, or partly at the hospital and partly at home. 
For each of the two hierarchies, benefits and costs, the goal clearly 
had to be choosing the best hospice. We placed this goal at the top of each 
hierarchy. Then the group discussed and identified overall criteria for 
each hierarchy; these criteria need not be the same for the benefits as for 
the costs. 
The two hierarchies are fairly clear and straightforward in their 
description. They descend from the more general criteria in the second 
level to secondary subcriteria in the third level and then to tertiary 
cubcriteria in the fourth level on to the alternatives at the bottom or fifth 
level. 
At the general criteria level, each of the hierarchies, benefits or 
costs, involved three major interests. The decision should benefit the 
recipient, the institution, and society as a whole, and their relative 
importance is the prime determinant as to which outcome is more likely 
to be preferred. We located these three elements on the second level of 
the benefits hierarchy. As the decision would benefit each party differently 
and the importance of the benefits to each recipient affects the outcome, 
the group thought that it was important to specify the types of benefit for 
the recipient and the institution. Recipients want physical, psycho-social 
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and economic benefits, while the institution wants only psychosocial 
and economic benefits. We located these benefits in the third level of the 
hierarchy. Each of these in turn needed further decomposition into 
specific items in terms of which the decision alternatives could be 
evaluated. For example, while the recipient measures economic benefits 
in terms of reduced costs and improved productivity, the institution 
needed the more specific measurements of reduced length of stay, better 
utilization of resources, and increased financial support from the 
community. There was no reason to decompose the societalbenefits into 
a third level subcriteria, hence societal benefits connects directly to the 
fourth level. The group considered three models for the decision 
alternatives, and located them on the bottom or fifth level of the 
hierarchy: In Model 1, the hospital provided full care to the patients; In 
Model 2, the family cares for the patient at home, and the hospital 
provides only emergency treatment (no nurses go to the house); and in 
Model 3, the hospital and the home share patient care (with visiting 
nurses going to the home). 
In the costs hierarchy there were also three major interests in the 
second level that would incur costs or pains: community, institution, 
and society. In this decision the costs incurred by the patient were not 
included as a separate factor. Patient and family could be thought of as 
part of the community. We thought decomposition was necessary only 
for institutional costs. We included five such costs in the third level: 
capital costs, operating costs, education costs, bad debt costs, and 
recruitment costs. Educational costs apply to educating the community 
and training the staff. Recruitment costs apply to staff and volunteers. 
Since both the costs hierarchy and the benefits hierarchy concern the 
same decision, they both have the same alternatives in their bottom 
levels, even though the costs hierarchy has fewer levels. 
Judgments and Comparisons 
A judgment or comparison is the numerical representation of a 
relationship between two elements that share a common parent. The set 
of all such judgments can be represented in a square matrix in which the 
set of elements is compared with itself. Each judgment represents the 
dominance of an element in the column on the left over an element in the 
row on top. It reflects the answers to two questions: which of the two 
elements is more important with respect to a higher level criterion, and 
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how strongly, using the 1-9 scale shown in Table 1 for the element on 
the left over the element at the top of the matrix. If the element on the left 
is less important than that on the top of the matrix, we enter the 
reciprocal value in the corresponding position in the matrix. It is 
important to note that the lesser element is always used as the unit and 
the greater one is estimated as a multiple of that unit. From all the paired 
comparisons we calculate the priorities and exhibit them on the right of 
the matrix. For a set of n elements in a matrix one needs n(n-1)/2 
comparisons because there are n 1’s on the diagonal for comparing 
elements with themselves and of the remaining judgments, half are 
reciprocals. Thus we have (n2-n)/2 judgments. In some problems one 
may elicit only the minimum of n-1 judgments. 
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For tied activities when elements are close and nearly mdistinguishable, 
moderate is 1.3 and extreme is 1.9 
Table 1: The Fundamental Scale. A scale of absolute numbers used to assign numerical 
values to judgments made by comparing two elements with the smaller element used 
as the unit and the larger one assigned a value from this scale as a multiple of that unit. 
As usual with the AHP, in both the cost and the benefits models, we 
compared the criteria and subcriteria according to their relative 
importance with respect to the parent element in the adjacent upper 
level. For example, in the first matrix of comparisons of the three benefits 
criteria with respect to the goal of choosing the best hospice alternative, 
83 
l 
1 Recipient Beneflts 
113 
Societal Benefits 115 
Institutional Benefits 
I 
3 5 .64 
1 3 .26 
113 1 .11 
i . ,  
Choosing Bei1 Hospice 1 Recipient Benefits institutional Benefits 
recipient benefits are moderately more important than institutional 
benefits and are assigned the absolute number 3 in the (1,2) or first-row 
second-column position. Three signifies three times more. The reciprocal 
value is automatically entered in the (2,l) position, where institutional 
benefits on the left are compared with recipient benefits at the top. 
Similarly a 5, corresponding to strong dominance or importance, is 
assigned to recipient benefits over social benefits in the (1,3) position, 
and a 3, corresponding tomoderate dominance, is assigned to institutional 
benefits over social benefits in the (2,3) position with corresponding 
reciprocals in the transpose positions of the matrix. 
Judgments in amatrixmaynot be consistent. Ineliciting judgments, 
one makes redundant comparisons to improve the validity of the 
answer, given that respondents may be uncertain or may make poor 
judgments in comparing some of the elements. Redundancy gives rise 
to multiple comparisons of an element with other elements and hence to 
numerical inconsistencies. For example, where we compare recipient 
benefits with institutional benefits and with societal benefits, we have 
the respective judgments 3 and 5 .  Now if x = 3y and x = 52 then 3y = 52 
or y = 5/3 z. If the judges were consistent, institutional benefits would 
be assigned the value 5 / 3  instead of the 3 given in the matrix. Thus the 
judgments are inconsistent. In fact, we are not sure which judgments are 
more accurate and which are the cause of the inconsistency. Inconsistency 
is inherent in the judgment process. Inconsistency may be considered a 
tolerable error in measurement only when it is of a lower order of 
magnitude (10 percent) than the actual measurement itself; otherwise 
the inconsistency would bias the result by a sizable error comparable to 
or exceeding the actual measurement itself. 
Social Benefits Priorities 
C.R.  = ,033 
Table 2: The entries in this matrix respond to the question, Which criterion is more 
important with respect to choosing the best hospice alternative and how strongly? 
When the judgments are inconsistent, the decision maker may not 
know where the greatest inconsistency is. The AHP can show one by one 
in sequential order which judgments are the most inconsistent, and that 
suggests the value that best improves consistency. However, this 
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recommendation may not necessarily lead to a more accurate set of 
priorities that correspond to some underlying preference of the decision 
makers. Greater consistency does not imply greater accuracy and one 
should go about improving consistency (if one can given the available 
knowledge) by making slight changes compatible with one' s 
understanding. If one cannot reach an acceptable level of consistency, 
one should gather more information or reexamine the framework of the 
hierarchy. 
Under each matrix I have indicated a consistency ratio (CR) 
comparing the inconsistency of the set of judgments in that matrix with 
what it would be if the judgments and the corresponding reciprocals 
were taken at random from the scale. For a 3-by-3 matrix this ratio 
should be about five percent, for a 4-by-4 about eight percent, and for 
larger matrices, about 10 percent. 
Priorities are numerical ranks measured on a ratio scale. A ratio 
scale is a set of positive numbers whose ratios remain the same if all the 
numbers are multiplied by an arbitrary positive number. An example is 
the scale used to measure weight. The ratio of these weights is the same 
in pounds and in kilograms. Here one scale is just a constant multiple of 
the other. The object of evaluation is to elicit judgments concerning 
relative importance of the elements of the hierarchy to create scales of 
priority of influence. 
Because the benefits priorities of the alternatives at the bottom level 
belong to a ratio scale and their costs priorities also belong to a ratio 
scale, and since the product or quotient (but not the sum or the 
difference) of two ratio scales is also a ratio scale, to derive the answer 
we divide the benefits priority of each alternative by its costs priority. 
We then choose the alternative with the largest of these ratios. It is also 
possible to allocate a resource proportionately among the alternatives. 
I will explain how priorities are developed from judgments and 
how they are synthesized down the hierarchy by a process of weighting 
and adding to go from local priorities derived from judgments with 
respect to a single criterion toglobal priorities derived frommultiplication 
by the priority of the criterion and overall priorities derived by adding 
the global priorities of the same element. The local priorities are listed 
on the right of each matrix. If the judgments are perfectly consistent, and 
hence CR = O, we obtain the local priorities by adding the values in each 
row and dividing by the sum of all the judgments, or simply by 
normalizing the judgments in any column, by dividing each entry by the 
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In comparing the three models for patient care, we asked members 
of the planning association which model they preferred with respect to 
each of the covering or parent secondary criterion in level 3 or with 
respect to the tertiary criteria in level 4. For example, for the subcriterion 
direct care (located on the left-most branch in the benefits hierarchy), we 
obtained a matrix of paired comparisons (Table 4) in which Model 1 is 
preferred over Models 2 and 3 by 5 and 3 respectively and Model 3 is 
preferred by 3 over Model 2. The group first made all the comparisons 
using semantic terms for the fundamental scale and then translated 
them to the corresponding numbers. 
' I  
bAodel I Model Il Model Ill 
1 5 3 
Direct care of patient 
Model I - UnitiTeam 
Model Il - MixadiHoms Cars  1 1 I3 115 
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Table 8 shows two ways or modes of synthesizing the local 
priorities of the alternatives using the global priorities of their parent 
criteria: The distributive mode and the ideal mode. In the distributive 
mode, the weights of the alternatives sum to one. It is used when there 
is dependence among the alternatives and a unit priority is distributed 
among them. The ideal mode is used to obtain the single best alternative 
regardless of what other alternatives there are. In the ideal mode, the 
local priorities of the alternatives are divided by the largest value among 
them. This is done for each criterion; for each criterion one alternative 
becomes an ideal with value one. In both modes, the local priorities are 
weighted by the global priorities of the parent criteria and synthesized 
and the benefit-to-cost ratios formed. In this case, both modes lead to the 
same outcome for hospice, which is model 3. As we shall see below, we 
needboth modes to deal with the effect of adding (or deleting) alternatives 
on an already ranked set. 
Model 3 has the largest ratio scale values of benefits to costs in both 
the distributive and ideal modes, and the hospital selected it for treating 
terminal patients. This need not always be the case. In this case, there is 
dependence of the personnel resources allocated to the three models 
because some of these resources would be shifted based on the decision. 
Therefore the distributive mode is the appropriate method of synthesis. 
If the alternatives were sufficiently distinct with no dependence in their 
definition, the ideal mode would be the way to synthesize. 
1 also performed marginal analysis to determine where the hospital 
should allocate additional resources for the greatest marginal return. To 
perform marginal analysis, I first ordered the alternatives by increasing 
cost priorities and then formed the benefit-to-cost ratios corresponding 
to the smallest cost, followed by the ratios of the differences of successive 
benefits to costs. If this difference in benefits is negative, the new 
alternative is dropped from consideration and the process continued. 
The alternative with the largest marginal ratio is then chosen. For the 
costs and corresponding benefits from the synthesis rows in Table 8 I 
obtained: 
costs: .20 .21 .59 
Benefits: .12 .45 .43 
MarginalRatios: - = 0 . 6 0  *=33 ~ ~ = - I J . O ~  
.12 
. 2 0  .21-.20 . 5 9 - . 2 1  
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dodd 1 1Mdd 21 Model 3 
0.04 0.10 I 0.26 
0.64 0.10 I 0.26 
0.09 I 0.17 I 0.74 
0.46 I 0.22 I 0.32 
ù.30 I 0.08 I 0.62 
0.30 I 0.08 I 0.62 
0.30 ! 0.00 I 0.82 
0.12 I 0.65 I 0.23 
0.12 I 0.27 I 0.61 
0.63 I 0.08 I 0.29 
0.64 I 0.10 ! 0.26 
0.65 I 0.23 0.12 
0.26 I 0.10 I 0.04 
0.09 I 0.22 0.09 
0.73 I 0.W I 0.19 
0.24 I 0.14 1 0.82 
0.428 i 0.121 1 0.451 
I I 
0.33 I 0.33 I 0.33 
0.76 I 0.09 I 0.15 
0.73 1 0.W I 0.19 
0.65 I 0.24 I 0.11 
0.56 i 0.32 I 0.12 
0.66 I 0 . 1 7  I 0.17 
0.60 0.20 0.20 
0.33 I 0.33 i 0.33 -
0.583 I O 192 ' 0.224 
0.734 ! 0.030 2.013 
0.20 I 0.20 I 0.00 
I l  
0.60 I 0.20 I 0.20 
Ideal Mode 
Model 1 I Model 2 ' Model 3 
1,000 0.150 I 0.406 
1,000 I 0.156 0.406 
0.122 I 0.230 I 1.000 
1.000 ; 0.470 I 0.698 
0.404 I 0.129 I 1.000 
0.404 I 0.129 I 1.000 
0.484 I 0.129 I 1.000 
0.105 I 1.000 I 0.354 
0.197 ! 0.443 I 1.000 
1 . m  I 0.127 I 0.460 
1.000 I 0.156 0.406 
1,000 I 0.354 I 0.105 
0.408 I 0.406 I 1.000 
0,130 10.130 ! 1.000 
0.333 I 0.333 I 1.000 
0.307 ! 0.226 ! 1.000 
-
1,000 I 1.OOo I 0.260 
0.424 I 0,123 I 0.453 
I , 
I l  
1.OOo I 1.000 I 1.000 
1 . m  I o . 1 1 0  I 0.260 
i.Oo0 I 0.118 I 0.197 
1 . m  I 0.369 I 0.169 
1,000 0.571 I 0.214 
1.000 I 0.333 I 0.333 
1 OW I 0.250 0.250 
1.ooO 0.333 I 0.333 
1,000 I 1.000 I 1.Oo0 
~ 
0,523 I 0.229 ! 0.249 
0.811 ! 0.537 ! 1.819 
Table 8: The benefit/cost ratios of the three models given in the bottom row of the table 
are obtained for both the distributive and ideal modes. Here one multiplies each of the 
six columns of priorities of a model by the column of criteria weights on the left and 
adds to obtain the synthesis of overall priorities, once for the benefits (top half of table) 
and once for the costs (bottom half of table) and forms the ratios of corresponding 
synthesis numbers to arrive at the benefit/cost ratio (bottom row of table). 
The third alternative is not a contender for resources because its 
marginal return is negative. The second alternative is best. in fact, in 
addition to adopting the third model, the hospital management chose 
the second model of hospice care for further development. 
A Sustainable Metropolitan Growth Problem 
In the following illustration there are nine alternatives evaluated in 
terms of benefit, cost and risk impacts to sustain metropolitan growth. 
Here again one asks which is more risky (or hazardous) and in the end one 
divides the benefit to cost ratios by the overall risk priorities of each 
alternative. The alternatives are: build infrastructure (of roads, 
telecommunication, banking, etc.), improve quality of life, reduce taxes, 
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I Benefits I 
I J 
create increase improve 
jobs 
0.431 
I I I 
Inconsistency ratio for the entire benefits hierarchy = 0.0642. pZl 
mads 0.078 
’ water 0.027 
sewage 0.030 
police 0.045 
flre safety 0.040 i schmis 0.060 crime 0.062 traffic 0.030 deaths 0.018 poverty 0.148 noise pollution 0.047 government 0.069 waste mgrnt. 0.056 I i 
Lswer 0.108 








quality of life 0.101 
recession 0.084 
jobs 0.067 
no growth 0.042 
business failures 0.068 t tive rate of return 0.132 I 
I 
I I I 1 
status quo (or do nothing), provide land for expansion, foster increased 
tourism,expandport, support industriesandimproveregionalconnections. 
The criteria in each of the three hierarchies are different and will not be 
described in the text because they are laid out in the diagrams. The 
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1 4 1.3 3 0.431 
114 1 1 13 112 0.097 
lA.3 3 1 1.5 il 294 
1 I3 2 111.5 1 0.177 
distributive mode was used to synthesize the priorities of the alternatives. 
We only give the overall inconsistency in the case of the benefits hierarchy. 
To save space we have not given all the matrices of paired comparisons. We 
only illustrate with the matrices of criteria for each hierarchy and only one 
set of subcriteria under social costs. 
The ranking of the alternatives descends from reduce taxes, improve 
quality of life, provide land, maintain status quo, build infrastructure and 
so on. One could allocate resources proportionately to these ratio scale 
outcomes. 






Physical Social Environmental Priorities 
1 1.3 1.2 0.384 
111.3 1 1.2 0.323 
111.2 111.2 1 0.293 
1 Create jobs Increase Quality Improve I Priorities 






Economic Social Environmental 1 Priorities 
1 1.3 1.3 0.393 
111.3 1 1.2 0.322 
Environmental 111.3 1.2 1 
greater cost with respect to that subcriterion? 
0.285 
Societal Costs Crime Traffic Deaths Poverty Government Priorities 
Crime 111.4 
Deaths 111.67 0.056 
Poverty 0.448 
Government 1.4 2 5 1 I3 1 0.213 
C.R. = 0.041 
Which subcriterion is a more important social cost? 
C.R. = 0.004 
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Which criterion is a more important risk? Which alternative incurs 
greater risk with respect to that subcriterion? 
Absolute Measurement 
Cognitive psychologists have recognized for some time that people 
are able to make two kinds of comparisons - absolute and relative. In 
absolute comparisons, people compare alternatives with a standard in 
their memory that they have developed through experience. In relative 
comparisons, they compared alternatives in pairs according to a common 
attribute, as we did throughout the hospice example. 
People use absolute measurement (sometimes also called rating) to 
rank independent alternatives one at a time in terms of rating intensities 
for each of the criteria. An intensity is a range of variation of a criterion 
that enables one to distinguish the quality of an alternative for that 
criterion. An intensity may be expressed as a numerical range of values 
if the criterion is measurable or in qualitative terms. For example, if 
ranking students is the objective and one of the criteria on which they are 
to be ranked is performance in mathematics, the mathematics ratings 
might be: excellent, good, average, below average, poor; or, using the 
usual school terminology, A, B, C, D, and F. Relative comparisons are 
first used to set priorities on the ratings themselves. If desired, one can 
fit a continuous curve through the derived intensities. This concept may 
go against our socialization. However, it is perfectly reasonable to ask 
how much an A is preferred to a B or to a C. The judgment of how much 
an A is preferred to a B might be different under different criteria. 
Perhaps for mathematics an A is very strongly preferred to a B, while for 
physical education an A is only moderately preferred to a B. So the end 
result might be that the ratings are scaled differently. For example one 



















The alternatives are then rated or ticked off one at a time on the 
intensities. 
I will illustrate absolute measurement with an example. A firm 
evaluates its employees for raises. The criteria are dependability, 
education, experience, and quality. Each criterion is subdivided into 
intensities, standards, or subcriteria (Figure 3). The managers set priorities 
for the criteria by comparing them in pairs. They then pairwise compare 
the intensities according to priority with respect to their parent criterion 
(as in Table 9) or with respect to a subcriterion if they are using a deeper 
hierarchy. The priorities of the intensities are divided by the largest 
intensity for each criterion (second column of priorities in Figure 3). 
Table 9 shows a paired comparison matrix of intensities with respect to 
dependability. 
Doctorate 
Unsatisfactory - Uneducated - None Unsatisfactory 
10.027) 0.148 (0.007) 0.049 (0.006) 0.070 (0.003) 0.054 
Outstanding Above Average Average Below Average Unsatisfactory Pnonties 
Ouisianduig 1 .o 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 0.419 
Above Average 112 I .o 2.0 3.0 4.0 0.263 
Average 1/3 1 /2 1 .o 2.0 3.0 0.160 
Below Average 1 /4 1 /3 1 /2 1 .o 2.0 0.097 
Unsatisfactory 1 /5 I /4 113 112 1.0 0.062 
Table 9: Ranking intensities: Which intensity is preferred most with respect to 
dependability and how strongly? 
The managers answer the question: which intensity is more 
important and by how much with respect to dependability. Finally, the 
managers rate each individual (Table 10) by assigning the intensity 
rating that applies to him or her under each criterion. The scores of these 
intensities are each weighted by the priority of its criterion and summed 
to derive a total ratio scale score for the individual (shown on the right 
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Dependability Education Experience Quality 
.4347 ,2774 . I775 . 1 I23 
1. ~ & m ,  V Outstanding Bachelor A Little Outstanding 
2. Becker. L 
3. Hayat, F Average Masters .4 Lot Below Average 
4. K-l-, S Above Average H.S. None Above Average 
5. OShea, K Average Doctorate A Lot Above Average 
6. Peters, T 
7.  Tobias, K Above Average Bachelor Average Above Average 
Average Bachelor A Little Outstanding 
Average Doctorate A Lot Average 
Table 10: Ranking alternatives. The priorities of the intensities for each criteri-n are 
divided by the largest one and multiplied by the priority of the criterion. Each alternati- 
ve is rated on each criterion by assigning the appropriate intensity. The weighted 









Homogeneity and Clustering 
Think of the following situation: we need to determine the relative 
size of a blueberry and a watermelon. Here, we need a range greater than 
1-9. Humanbeings have difficulty establishing appropriate relationships 
when the ratios get beyond 9. To resolve this human difficulty, we can 
use a method in which we cluster different elements so we can rate them 
within a cluster and then rate them across the clusters. We need to add 
other fruits to make the comparison possible and then form groups of 
comparable fruits. In the first group we include the blueberry, a grape, 
and a plum. In the second group we include the same plum, an apple, 
and a grapefruit. In the third group we include the same grapefruit, a 
melon, and the watermelon. The AHP requires reciprocal comparisons 
of homogeneous elements whose ratios do not differ by much on a 
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property, hence the absolute scale 1-9; when the ratios are larger, one 
must cluster the elements in different groups and use a common element 
(pivot) that is the largest in one cluster and the smallest element in the 
next cluster of the next higher order of magnitude. The weights of the 
elements in the second group are divided by the priority of the pivot in 
that group and then multiplied by the priority of the same pivot element 
(whose value is generally different) from the first group, making them 
comparable with the first group. The process is then continued. The 
AHP software program Expert Choice performs these functions for the 
user. The reason for using clusters of a few elements is to ensure greater 
stability of the priorities in face of inconsistent judgments. Comparing 
more than two elements allows for redundancy and hence also for 
greater validity of real-world information. The AHP often uses seven 
elements and puts them in clusters if there are more. (Elaborate 
mathematical derivations are given in the AHP to show that the number 
of elements compared should not be too large in order to obtain 
priorities with admissible consistency.) 
Problems with Analytic Decision Making 
At this point you may wonder why we have three different modes 
for establishing priorities, the absolute measurement mode and the 
distributive and ideal modes of relative measurement. Isn’t one enough? 
Let me explain why we need more than one mode. 
A major reason for having more than one mode is concerned 
with this question. What happens to the synthesized ranks of 
alternatives when new ones are added or old ones deleted? With 
consistent judgments, the original relative rank order cannot change 
under any single criterion, but it can under several criteria. 
Assume that an individual has expressed preference among a 
set of alternatives, and that as a result, he or she has developed a 
ranking for them. Can and should that individual’s preferences and 
the resulting rank order of the alternatives be affected if alternatives 
are added to the set or deleted from it and if no criteria are added 
or deleted, which would affect the weights of the old criteria? What 
if the added alternatives are copies or near copies of one or of 
several of the original alternatives and their number is large? Rank 
reversal is an unpleasant property if it is caused by-the addition of 
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truly irrelevant alternatives. However, the addition of alternatives 
may just reflect human nature: the straw that broke the camel's back was 
considered irrelevant along with all those that went before it. 
Mathematically, the number and quality of newly added alternatives 
are known to affect preference among the original alternatives. Most 
people, unaided by theory and computation, make each decision 
separately, and they are not very concerned with rank reversal unless 
they are forced for some reason to refer to their earlier conclusions. I 
think it is essential to understand and deal with this phenonemon. 
An Example of Rank Reversal 
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ordinary people process information in their minds in attempting to 
make a decision and how do they express the strength of their 
judgments? The answer to this question led me to consider hierarchies 
and networks, paired comparisons, ratio scales, homogenity and 
consistency, priorities, ranking, and the AHP. 
Resolution of the Rank Preservation Issue 
Early developers of utility theory axiomatically ruled that 
introducing alternatives, particularly "irrelevant" ones, should not 
cause rank reversal [Luce and Raiffa 19571. A theory that rates 
alternatives one at a time, as in the absolute measurement salary-raise 
example given above, assumes the existence of past standards 
established by experts for every decision problem and would thus 
assume that every decision can be made by rating each altemative by 
itself without regard to any other alternative and would inexorably 
preserve rank. But if past standards are inapplicable to new problems 
and if experts are not sufficiently familiar with the domain of a decision 
to establish standards and the environment changes rapidly, an 
insistence on making decisions based on standards will only force the 
organization to shift its efforts from solving the problem to updating 
its standards. For example, practitioners have improvised many 
techniques to relate standards defined by utility functions in the 
context of a specific decision problem. Connecting theory to practice 
is important but often difficult. We need to distinguish between fixing 
the axioms of a decision theory to be followed strictly in all situations 
and learning and revising in the process of making a decision. The rank 
preservation axioms of utility theory and the AHP parallel the axioms 
of the classical frequentist method of statistics and Bayesian theory. 
Bayesian theory violates the axioms of statistics in updating prediction 
by including information from a previous outcome, a process known 
as learning. When we integrate learning with decision making, we 
question some of the static basic axioms of utility theory. 
The AHP avoids this kind of formulation and deals directly with 
paired comparisons of the priority of importance, preference, or 
likelihood (probability) of pairs of elements in terms of a common 
attrib Ute or criterion represented in the decision hierarchy. We 
believe that this is the natural (but refined) method that people 
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followed in making decisions long before the development of utility 
functions and before the AHP was formally developed. 
The major objection raised against the AHP by practitioners of 
utility theory has been this issue of rank reversal. The issues of rank 
reversal and preference reversal have been much debated in the literature 
as a problem of utility theory [Gretha and Plott 1979; Hershey and 
Schoemaker 1980; Pommerehne, Schneider, and Zweifel 1982; Saaty 
1994, Chapter 5; Tversky and Simonson 1993, Tversky, Slovic, and 
Kahneman 19901. 
Regularity is a condition of choice theory that has to do with rank 
preservation. R. Corbin and A. Marley [1974] provide a utility theory 
example of rank reversal. It "concerns a lady in a small town, who wishes 
to buy a hat. She enters the only hat store in town, and finds two hats, 
A and 8, that she likes equally well, and so might be considered equally 
likely to buy. However, now suppose that the sales clerk discovers a 
third hat, C, identical to B. Then the lady may well choose hat A for sure 
(rather than risk the possibility of seeing someone wearing a hat just like 
hers), a result that contradicts regularity". Utility theory has no clear 
analytical answer to this paradox nor to famous examples having to do 
with phantom alternatives and with decoy alternatives that arise in the 
field of marketing [Saaty 19941. 
Because of such examples, it is clear that one cannot simply use one 
procedure for every decision problem because that procedure would 
either preserve or not preserve rank. Nor can one introduce new criteria 
that indicate the dependence of the alternatives on information from 
each new alternative that is added. In the AHP, this issue has been 
resolved by adding the ideal mode to the normalization mode in relative 
measurement. The ideal mode presents an alternative that is rated low 
or "irrelevant" on all the criteria from affecting the rank of higher rated 
alternatives. 
In the AHP, we have one way to allow rank to change, (i) below, 
and two ways to preserve rank, (2) and (3) below. 
(1) We can allow rank to reverse by using the distributive mode of 
the relative measurement approach of the AHP. 
(2) We can preserve rank in the case of irrelevant alternatives by 
using the ideal mode of the AHP relative measurement approach. 
(3) We can preserve rank absolutely by using the absolute 
measurement mode of the AHP. 
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As a recap, in relative measurement, we use normalization by 
dividing by the sum of the priorities of the alternatives to define the 
distributive mode. In this mode, we distribute the unit value assigned 
to the goal of a decision proportionately among the alternatives through 
normalization. When we add a new alternative, it takes its share of the 
unit from the previously existing alternatives. This mode allows for rank 
reversal because dependence exists among the alternatives, which is 
attributable to the number of alternatives and to their measurements 
values and which is accounted for through normalization. For example, 
multiple copies of an alternative can affect preference for that alternative 
in some decisions. We need to account for such dependence in allocating 
resources, in voting and in distributing resources among the alternatives. 
In the ideal mode, we would simply compare a new alternative 
with the ideal (with the weight of one), and it would fall below or 
above the ideal and could itself become the ideal. As a result, an 
alternative that falls far below the ideal on every criterion cannot 
affect the rank of the best chosen alternative. Using absolute 
measurement, we rate alternatives one at a time with respect to each 
criterion, and this process cannot give rise to rank reversal. 
I conducted an experiment involving 64,000 hierarchies with 
priorities assigned randomly to criteria and to alternatives to test the 
number of times the best choice obtained by the distributive and ideal 
modes coincided with each other. It turns out that the two methods 
yield the same top alternative 92 percent of the time. I obtained 
similar results for the top two alternatives [Saaty and Vargas 1993al. 
Decision Making in Complex Enviromnents 
The AHP makes group decision making possible by aggregating 
judgments in a way that satisfies the reciprocal relation in comparing 
two elements. It then takes the geometric mean of the judgments. When 
the group consists of experts, each works out his or her own hierarchy, 
and the AHP combines the outcomes by the geometric mean. If the 
experts are ranked according to their expertise in a separate hierarchy, 
we can raise their individual evaluations to the power of their importance 
or expertise priorities before taking the geometric mean. We have also 
used special questionnaires to gather data in the AHP. 
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Practitioners have developed multicriteria decision approaches 
largely around techniques for generating scales for alternatives. But I 
believe that making decisions in real life situations depends on the depth 
and sophistication of the structures decision makers use to represent a 
decision or prediction problem rather than simply on manipulations - 
although they are also important. It seems to me that decision making 
and prediction must go hand in hand if a decision is to survive the test 
of the forces it may encounter. If one understands the lasting value of a 
best decision, one will want to consider feedback structures with 
possible dependencies among all the elements. These would require 
iterations with feedback to determine the best outcome and the most 
likely to survive. I believe that ratio scales are mathematically compelling 
for this process. The AHP is increasingly used for decisions with 
interdependencies (the hierarchic examples I have described are simple 
special cases of such decisions). I describe applications of feedback in 
Chapter 8 of Saaty [1994] and in a book I am currently writing on 
applications of feedback. I and my colleague Luis Vargas used the 
supermatrix feedback approach of the AHP in October 1992 to show that 
the well-known Bayes theorem used in decision making follows from 
feedback in the AHP. Furthermore, we have since shown through 
examples that some decisions with interdependence can be treated by 
the AHP but not Bayes theorem [Saaty and Vargas 1993bl. 
The essence of the AHP is the use of ratio scales in elaborate 
structures to assess complex problems. Ratio scales are the fundamental 
tool of the mind that people use to understand magnitudes. The AHP 
well fits the words of Thomas Paine in his Common Sense, "The more 
simple anything is, the less liable it is to be disordered and the easier 
repaired when disordered. " 
In August 1993, Sarah Becker compiled a list of what are now more 
than 1,000 papers, books, reports, and dissertations written on the 
subject of AHP, an early version of which is included as a bibliography 
in my 1994 book [Saaty 19941. 
The Benefits of Analytic Decision Making 
Many excellent decision makers do not rely on a theory to make 
their decisions. Are their good decisions accidental, or are there implicit 
logical principles that guide the mind in the process of making a 
decision, and are these principles complete and consistent? I believe that 
there are such principles, and that in thoughtful people, they work as 
formalized and described in the analytic hierarchy process. Still academics 
differ about how people should and should not make decisions. 
Experiments with people have shown that what people do differs from 
the theoretical and normative considerations the experts consider 
important. This may lead one to believe that analytical decision making 
is of little value. But our experience and that of many others indicate the 
opposite. 
Analytic decision making is of tremendous value, but it must be 
simple and accessible to the lay user, and must have scientific 
justification of the highest order. Here are a few ideas about the 
benefits of the descriptive analytical approach. First is the morphological 
way of thoroughly modeling the decision, inducing people to make 
explicit their tacit knowledge. This leads people to organize and 
harmonize their different feelings and understanding. An agreed upon 
structure provides ground for a complete multisided debate. Second, 
particularly in the framework of hierarchies and feedback systems, the 
process permits decision makers to use judgments and observations to 
surmise relations and strengths of relations in the flow of interacting 
forces moving from the general to the particular and to make predictions 
of most likely outcomes. Third, people are able to incorporate and 
trade off values and influences with greater accuracy of understanding 
than they can using language alone. Fourth, people are able to include 
judgments that result from intuition and emotion as well those that 
result from logic. Reasoning takes a long time to learn, and it is not a 
skill common to all people. By representing the strength of judgments 
numerically and agreeing on a value, decision-making groups do not 
need to participate in prolonged argument. Finally, a formal approach 
allows people to make gradual and more thorough revisions and to 
combine the conclusions of different people studying the same problem 
in different places. One can also use such an approach to piece together 
partial analyses of the components of a bigger problem, or to decom- 
pose a larger problem into its constituent parts. This is an exhaustive 
list of the uses of the AHP. However, to deal with complexity we need 
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The AHP has four axioms, (1) reciprocal judgments, (2) 
homogeneous elements, (3) hierarchic or feedback dependent structure, 
and (4) rank order expectations. 
Assume that one is given iz stones, A,, ..., An, with known weights 
w, ..., wn, respectively, and suppose that a matrix of pairwise ratios is 
formed whose rows give the ratios of the weights of each stone with 
respect to all others. Thus one has the equation: 
Al 
An 
Aw = i 
where A has been multiplied on the right by the vector of weights w. The 
result of this multiplication is nw. Thus, to recover the scale from the 
matrix of ratios, one must solve the problem AW = izw or (A - ~ I ) w  = O. 
This is a system of homogeneous linear equations. It has a nontrivial 
solution if and only if the determinant of A-n1 vanishes, that is, n is an 
eigenvalue of A. Now A has unit rank since every row is a constant 
multiple of the first row. Thus all its eigenvalues except one are zero. The 
sum of the eigenvalues of a matrix is equal to its trace, the sum of its 
diagonal elements, and in this case the trace of A is equal to n. Thus N is 
an eigenvalue of A, and one has a nontrivial solution. The solution 
consists of positive entries and is unique to within a multiplicative 
cons tan t . 
To make w unique, one can normalize its entries by dividing by 
their sum. Thus, given the comparison matrix, one can recover the scale. 
In this case, the solution is any column of A normalized. Notice that in 
A the reciprocal property all = l/a,, holds; thus, also all = 1. Another 
property of A is that it is consistent: its entries satisfy the condition a,k = 
a,/nl,. Thus the entire matrix can be constructed from a set of n elements 
which form a chain across the rows and columns. 
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In the general case, the precise value of7u/ui, cannot be given, but 
instead only an estimate of it as a judgment. For the moment, consider 
an estimate of these values by an expert who is assumed to make 
small perturbations of the coefficients. This implies small 
perturbations of the eigenvalues. The problem now becomes A‘w‘ = 
h, , , ;~’  where A,, is the largest eigenvalue of A‘. To simplify the 
notation, we shall continue to write Aw = hmnxw, here A is the matrix 
of pairwise comparisons. The problem now is how good is the 
estimate of 7u. Notice that if 70 is obtained by solving this problem, the 
matrix whose entries are W,,/’Wl is a consistent matrix. It is a consistent 
estimate of the matrix A. A itself need not be consistent. In fact, the 
entries of A need not even be transitive; that is, A, may be preferred 
to A, and A, to A, but A, may be preferred to Al. What we would like 
is a measure of the error due to inconsistency. It turns out that A is 
consistent if and only if i,,,= 11 and that we always have L,,,>n. 
Since small changes in ay imply a small change in A,,, the 
deviation of the latter from n is a deviation from consistency and can 
be represented by ( Amay-n) /(n-1), which is called the consistency index 
( C , I . ) ,  When the consistency has been calculated, the result is compared 
with those of the same index of a randomly generated reciprocal 
matrix from the scale 1 to 9, with reciprocals forced. This index is 
called the random index (R.I.). The following gives the order of the 
matrix (first row) and the average R.I. (second row): 
n 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random Consistency Index (R.I.) O O .52 .89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
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The ratio of C.I. to the average R.I. for the same order matrix is 
called the consistency ratio (C.R.). A consistency ratio of 0.10 or less is 
positive evidence for informed judgment. 
The relations a,, = l/a,, and a,, = 1 are preserved in these matrices to 
improve consistency. The reason for this is that if stone #I is estimated 
to be k times heavier than stone #2, one should require that stone #2 be 
estimated to be l/k times the weight of the first. If the consistency ratio 
is significantly small, the estimates are accepted; otherwise, an attempt 
is made to improve consistency by obtaining additional information. 
What contributes to the consistency of a judgment are (1) the homogeneity 
of the elements in a group, that is, not comparing a grain of sand with 
a mountain; (2) the sparseness of elements in the group, because an 
1 
. I  
individual cannot hold in mind simultaneously the relations of many 
more than a few objects; and (3) the knowledge and care of the decision 
maker about the problem under study. 
Figure 5 shows five areas to which we can apply to the paired 
comparison process in a matrix and use the 1-9 scale to test the validity 
of the procedure. We can approximate the priorities in the matrix by 
assuming that it is consistent. We normalize each column and then take 
the average of the corresponding entries in the columns. 
Figure 5: Five figures drawn with appropriate size of area. The object is to compare 
them in pairs to reproduce their relative weights. 
The actual relative values of these areas are A=0.47, B=0.05, C=0.24, 
D=O. 14, and E=0.09 with which the answer may be compared. By 
comparing more than two alternatives in a decision problem, one is able 
to obtain better values for the derived scale because of redundancy in the 
comparisons, which helps improve the overall accuracy of the judgments. 
There aren't abstracts in english language and in french language because they aren't 
furnished by the Author; so we are sorry. 
11 n'y a pas les résumés en englais et franqaise pas evoyés par 1'A.; nous Vous prions de 
nous excuser. 
Mancano i sommari in lingua inglese e in lingua francese non forniti dall'autore; ci 
scusiamo vivamente di ciò. 
I 
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